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THE NATURE OF THE BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST
IN A TRUST
RUFFORD G. PATTON *

The title of this study is not new either to Anglicans or to Latins. However, they usually approach it from two different angles. The Anglicans
deal with it on the basis of (1) the beneficiary's remedies before the court
'n protecting his interests as against the settlor, the trustee and third
parties, with (2) more or less incidental discussion of whether he or the
trustee is the owner of the trust assets and consequently as to whether
the interest of the beneficiary is legal or equitable. This is confusing to the
Latin both as to the order of importance given to the two divisions of the
subject and by reason of splitting what he considers the major subdivision
of the subject into two types of ownership. The object of the present study
is to explain to our guests these two seeming inconsistencies and to overcome the confusion which they have created; also to attempt to explain
to the Anglicans the importance which the Latins attach to having a definition in the organic statute which will accurately define the institution and
locate the situs of title to the assets. Since it is the older of the two, suppose we consider first the Anglican viewpoint and the circumstances under
which it has developed.
The institution now known as a trust did not come to us as a full-fledged
device for the handling of property. No eminent scholar sat down and drafted
from his vast experience and research a statement of the elements of which
it should be composed, the rules under which it should operate and the rights
and interests of the parties involved. Instead the first writings regarding it
were drafted as desciptions of an institution that had already been developed
by trial and error to meet the exigencies of legal and economic conditions
then existing in England, mostly by reason of the fact that people desired to
convey or to will real estate to the church or to some of its orders at a time
when the law did not recognize a will of real estate and did not permit real
estate to be owned by religious corporations.
Not but that there have always been occasions when it suited the convenience of the owner of property to have the title held by another for the
accomplishment of some particular purpose to which it was desired to dedicate it. In early Roman law the fiducia served this purpose in transactions
between debtor and creditor. The creditor was both trustee and beneficiary;
in other words the title was conveyed to him to hold as security for the debt
*Member American Law Institute. Member Institute of Comparative Law of National University of Mexico. Professorial Lecturer, School of Law, University of Minnesota.
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due to him, but in trust for the benefit of both himself and the debtor who
had conveyed it to him. Under similar circumstances in England the transaction had no element of a fiduciary character: the conveyance to the creditor
was absolute subject only to his title being defeated by payment of the debt
on or prior to its maturity when he became under obligation to reconvey to
the debtor. Both of these security devices were later replaced by the use of
mortgages.
Under Roman law there has also developed the fideicomiso whose original purpose was to enable a testator to create a testamentary trust in
favor of a donee who should hold the title not for his own use but for the
use of a party to whom the testator could not make a direct gift. The institution became perverted by a substitution of successive trustees so as to
entail the property and it thus came to be prohibited. However, it was only
the substitutionary fideicomiso which was ever considered contrary to
public policy and a number of the civil codes still recognize the original
fideicomiso.
Nevertheless the necessity for carrying the title to property in the name
of a party other than the person who is to receive the income or other
benefit from it was apparently not of such frequent occurrence in the Latin
countries as in England, and the need for an institution of law which would
provide for such situations in those countries does not appear to have
been urgent until the advent of modern social and economic conditions. In
fact the use of the trust device in England and in other English speaking
countries was not extensive until within very recent years, although its use
did prevail to a sufficient extent to cause the gradual development of a body
of law defining the rights of the parties involved in such situations. Even in
England, where the trust institution in its modern form originated, trusts
occupied a comparatively minor place in the property of that country.
Trusts were usually of a family character and the trustee was a friend or
solicitor of the family. It is true that in some cases the trustee was an
officer of a corporation who acted in that capacity in his name but his
corporation did the work and made the charge for it, guaranteeing its
officer's fidelity. In this indirect way some insurance companies and banks
occasionally rendered trust services long before they were permitted to do
so in their own name. In 1887 The Trustees Corporation, Limited, of
London, was organized to act as a corporate trustee. Other trust corporations were later organized and early in the present century English banks
established trust departments and began to qualify as trustees. In 1906 the
government provided for the office of public trustee and that office has
been a continuing institution in England since January 1, 1908. The public
trustee is a government corporation composed of one man who is appointed
to the office by the Lord Chancellor. Although the corporation consists of
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the successive individuals who are appointed to the office it is not the
individuals who act as trustee, but the corporation, and the latter has continued perpetual existence. It is the largest trust corporation in England
and one of the largest in the world. From the time that the office of public
trustee was created trust business has increased enormously in England
not only as to trusts committed to the public trustee but also as to trusts
committed to individuals, banks and other corporations.'
Prior to 1885 trusts were employed in only a comparatively small area
of the United States, chiefly in the larger cities; New York, Philadelphia,
Boston and a few others. Since then there has been a steady increase in
the use of this institution. By 1925 this increase was becoming swift. It
accelerated with astonishing rapidity and was not slowed up by either
World War I or World War II.
The English law of trusts commenced with individuals as trustees. In
order that there might be a more or less perpetual succession in the office,
some of the trust instruments, particularly those used in Boston, provided
for successor trustees who were usually members of the same law firm as
the original trustee. As already stated, in England this continuity was
provided by a public corporation known as a public trustee, the corporation consisting always of a succession of public officers.2 In the United
States generally, the situation was met by appointing as trustee a corporation having perpetual existence or capable of renewing its charter so as to
secure continuance of corporate existence. 3
Up to 1839, only thirty-one (31) trust companies appear to have been
chartered. 4 With these early corporations the matter of acting as trustee
was more or less incidental to other business, such as receiving time deposits and carrying on an insurance business. The chartering of additional
companies who were authorized to do a trust business proceeded slowly.5
At the date of publication of the book just cited, 1902, the author was able
to list 573 trust companies then in existence in the United States. These
were located in those states which had experienced the greatest economic
development. As soon as citizens of a state began to accumulate fortunes,
there appears to have been need for trust companies. This is shown by the
1. See STEPHENSON, TRUST BUSINESS IN COMMON LAW COUNTRIES, 49-136 (1940).
2. See note I supra; also English Statute, 6 Edw. 7, c. 55 (1906).
3. The idea is said to have originated with Alexander Hamilton and Daniel Tomkins
at the early date of 1801 in connection with establishment of the Snug Harbor Trust of
Captain Robert R. Randall for the benefit of poor and indigent sailors. A trust instrument
designating as trustees certain public officers, they to be trustees regardless of the change
in individuals holding the office, thus the continuity of the office of trustee was assured
in spite of any change in personnel. Some five years later an act of the legislature
created a corporation composed of these officers. Thus a corporation came into existence.
4. Stephenson, Beginnings of Trust Companies of the United States, 48 TRUST
COMPANY MAGAZINE 343.
5. CATOR, TRUST COMPANIES

IN THE UNITED STATES

(1902).
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chartering after that date of numerous trust companies in the southern and
6
western states.
By 1913 a great many banks which existed under state laws had been
authorized to conduct a trust business. In that year Congress made it
possible for national banks to conduct this type of business. Since then
the number of trust departments of banks has increased tremendously.
Without repeating the statistics given in a previous study,7 it may be stated
that the trust departments of national banks appear to handle more than
half of the personal or family trusts. Significant figures are those showing
that the number of these trusts in 1926 was about twenty-six thousand
and in 1931 practically one hundred-three thousand; that the value of the
assets in the first group of trusts amounted to less than one billion dollars
and that the total in the second was more than five times that amount.
A substantial portion of the increase in business at that time and during
more recent years is due to the creation of trust companies and of trust
departments in banks in communities to which the creation of trust business has expanded from the larger and wealthier metropolitan centers. This
development in the United States has been followed by similar extensions
in both Canada and England.'
Aside from the increase in trusts created to serve directly the interest
of individuals and corporations there has been an increase in those which
may be designated as foundations, trusts created to carry out projects of
general or special public welfare. Of particular note are trusts of this
character created by George Peabody, Andrew Carnegie, the Rockefellers,
Mrs. Russell Sage and Messrs. Duke, Rosenwald and Field. The totals of
these foundations are staggering in their size.9
Of more general spread are trusts which can be created by people of
modest means, not out of accumulated wealth but out of the proceeds of
life insurance policies paid for in installments over a period of years. Commencing in 1869 with the Girard Trust Company of Philadelphia and proceeding very slowly from that beginning to other parts of the United States,
the amount involved in trusts of this character appears to have reached, in
1930, the sizeable amount of one and one-half billion dollars.' 0 Figures to
show the size of the increase since then do not appear to be available.
However, the main purpose of the smaller trusts in the United States has
been to provide for the family of the creator or for himself and his family.
6. SMITH, TRUST COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1928).

7. Patton, Trust Systems in the Western Hemisphere, 19 TULANE L. REV. 398 (1945);
Patton, Los SISTEMAS DE TRUST EN EL HEMISFERlO OCCIDENTAL, 23 JUs (Mexico) 399;
24 op. cit. 1; 19 REVISTA CU3ANA DIEDEdEcHo 19, 85; 15 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA
UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO 1.

8. POWELL, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 45 , 46.

9.

TRUST BUSINESS (American Institute of Banking) 4.39-441.
10. POWELL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 50.
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He has accomplished this not merely by the insurance trusts just mentioned
but also by the older form of a trust created by inter vivos agreement or
by the still older form, by provisions of his will. These do not total as much
in asset values as corporation trusts and foundations but they greatly
exceed all others in the total number. The exact figures are available in
standard trust literature but need hardly be set forth in this study.' I
The foregoing would indicate that even though the trust institution did
develop gradually over a period of many years in the Anglican countries,
there would have occurred controversies between settlors, trustees, beneficiaries and third parties which would produce legislation and judicial
decisions as to rights of these respective parties as against the others, and
particularly as to the rights of the parties for whom trusts are created,
the beneficiaries. With the exceptions noted at the beginning, and yet to
be examined, this was the case. In all the standard Anglican texts on the
subject of trusts there are subdivisions dealing with the rights of the
beneficiary.' 2 A recent Spanish text" by one of the ablest Mexican commentators states that an analytical review of the relevant legal texts shows
that most of the rights of beneficiaries there listed are expressly covered
by articles of the Mexican trust statutes which he lists. These are so typical
of any trust in any country that they are worth examining. The rights
listed are as follows:
1. Those granted to him by the trust instrument.
2. To enforce fulfillment by the trust institution.
3. To attack the validity of acts which it commits in bad faith to his
prejudice.
4. To attack the validity of acts which it commits to his prejudice in
excess of the powers given by the trust instrument or by statute.
5. To demand the return of assets which have been removed from the
trust estate as a result of such acts.
6. To select a trustee when the appointed trustee refuses to accept or
is removed, or when no fiduciary institution is named in the trust instrument.
7. To give his consent to decisions and rules made by a technical committee or by a committee for distribution of funds when the maker of the
trust has provided for the formation of such a committee.
8. To require information from the trustee within 48 hours as to investment, acquisition or substitution of trust property, the receipt of rents,
crops, or proceeds from liquidation, and as to the payments which have
been made out of the trust funds.
It.Id. at 51-54, and publications there listed.
12. LEWIN, LAW OF TRUSTS (London 1939) cc. 4, 5; ScoTT, TRUSTS 197-226, 28i,
282; BOGERT, TRUSTS, 543, 746, 868, 871, 961 65 C. J., TRUSTS 873-I006; S4 C. J.
TRUSTS,

306-337; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 62-75, 112,

113 (1935).

13, Molina, Los Derechos del Fideicornisario, Jus (Mexico, 1947) (editorial).
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9. To collect damages from the trustee for divulging any confidential information in connection with operation of the trust even to the authorities
or in court other than in actions brought by the settlor or the beneficiary.
10. To demand an accounting by the trustee.
11. To exact responsibility in general from the trustee for all damages
which may occur through non-feasance or malfeasance in its management
of the trust property.
12. To ask for removal of the trustee.

13. That in addition to the rights and actions expressly provided in the
statutory subdivisions cited, the beneficiary may have other rights and the
corresponding actions which are not predeterminable but which result from
fact situations growing out of the execution of the trust.
The learned commentator then proceeds to study these rights from various standpoints' 4 much the same as did the English and North American
writers of the texts already cited.' 5 It is not the purpose of the present study
to go into these details. Suffice to say that the various texts, Spanish and
English and the French treatise on the Quebec fiducie by Dr. Faribault of
Montreal,' 6 agree very substantially as to what are the practical rights of
the beneficiary. Controversies which may have previously existed have been
pretty well settled before now by statutes or judicial decisions. It is only
as to the more or less theoretical rights, that any serious difference of
opinion now exists-those which have seldom been before the courts and
which have little likelihood of judicial decision because they have little or
no bearing on issues which may arise between interested parties. The main
item of this character, and the only one which will be now considered, is as
to the situs and character of the title to the trust assets. Under the various
theories advanced, one takes the position that the beneficiary holds the title
and the trustee is merely his agent, the second that the trustee has the
title, another that ownership is divided between the trustee and the bene-

ficiary, and the fourth that neither has the title in that the trust assets
are dedicated to a purpose so that there need be no owner. For a reason
which will appear in the concluding statements of this study, these four
theories will now be examined in their general aspects only and not in any
great detail.
First Theory, that Beneficiary is the owner. In the French-Canadian
Province of Quebec the trust institution developed as in England by the
same process of use and adaptation to use.' 7 However, Dr. Faribault states
that when the institution was sanctioned by statute "the text of our articles
MOLINA, op. oji. supra note 13, c. 7.
15. See note 12 supra.

14.

16. FARIBAULT,

17. IbMd.

TRAITE

THEORIQUE

FT

PRATIQUE

DE LA FIDUCIE

(1936).
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has been borrowed, or rather adapted, from the English law."' 8 For many
years there prevailed two theories as to the nature of the fiducie (trust).
According to the first theory, it is only a variety of donation or legacy to
the beneficiary subject to an agency or mandato in favor of the trustee.
Although this view restricted the role of the fiducie, it bad the support of
treatise' 9 and judicial decision.2 0 Nevertheless the most recent decision
supports the other theory, namely that the trustee or fiduciarie takes the
title and that the beneficiary's right in the property is limited to compelling
management and disposition in accordance with the terms of the trust
instrument. 2 1 The main argument in support of this theory is that the
trust law of Quebec, art. 981a, provides for a "transfer to the fiduciaries."
The Supreme Court held that an acceptance by the fiduciarie dispossesses the
donor of title and that no act of the beneficiary is required; also that
this rule has the advantage of being consonant with the English law of
trusts. A partisan of this view is Professor Mignault3 2 Though Dr. Faribault originally preferred the concept that the trustee is merely the agent
of the beneficiary,2 3 he appears to have changed his view because in 1943
he wrote the author of this study, "I am in perfect agreement with your
conclusion that there is but little difference between a Quebec fiducie and
a trust for the same purpose in an Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction."
Second Theory, that Trustee is the Owner. As stated by the Supreme

Court of Quebec in the decision just cited, rendered in 1933, it was the prevailing theory at that time in England and in the United States that the
trustee was the owner and that such rights as were possessed by the beneficiary were in personam against the trustee or against third parties by reason
of their dealings with the trustee. 4 Though the subject is not expressly considered in the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, the definition there given 23

would indicate that this is the standard rule in the United States.
Third Theory, Double Ownership. However, two of the scholars most
responsible for the phraseology of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts,

Dr. Scott and Professor Bogert, are also authors of standard texts on
18. Id. at 393.
19. Casgrain, La Fiducie dams la Province de Quebec, LA LIVRE SOUVENIR DES
JOURNEES DU DRO1T CIVIL FRANCAIS 239.
20. Mathew v. Shepard, A.R.S.C. 29 (1908).
21. Curran v. Davis, S.C.R. 283 (1933).
22. Mignault, La Fiducia in the Province of Quebec, BOLETIN DE LA SOCIEDAD DE
LEGISLACION COMPARADA (1936).
23. Faribault, op. cit. supra note 16, at 82, 83.
24. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 76, 262, 289 (1913),
HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 231 (9th ed.); LANGDELL, BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION 5 (2d ed.
1908); MAITLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS, 129-134, 143-147, 170-174 (1936); Stone, The
Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COL. L. REV. 465-501 (1917).

25. See vol. 1, § 1 (1935).
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trust. 2 6

Their works state expressly that the trustee holds title, Yet,

Professor Bogert advances the conclusion that while the right of the beneficiary was originally solely in personam against the trustee, it has become
increasingly a right in rem and is now substantially equivalent to equitable
ownership of the trust res. Professor Scott affirmatively argues that the
beneficiary has a property interest and not merely a chose in action. His
27
conclusions had previously appeared as an article in a noted law review.
He has very eminent support from other commentators," with equally
eminent opinion to the contrary.2 9
Those who advance the view that the beneficiary has a property interest
in the trust assets admit that the trustee has the ownership so far as the
records are concerned; in other words, the only title which would have been
recognized in the early English law courts, a title which is now designated,
by reason of that fact, as the legal title. Nevertheless by reason of the fact
that under certain circumstances the equity courts would have recognized
the beneficiary as the actual owner, they assert that his interest is so great
that it amounts to a form of ownership, which, because of the sole forum
in which it could formerly be enforced, is designated as an equitable interest
or as equitable ownership.
Unfortunately the use of these terms, legal ownership and equitable
ownership, has produced confusion in that they have conveyed the impression that property held in trust is the subject of a double and conflicting ownership. In view of the fact that an English writer has said that a
trust with its peculiar Anglo-Saxon characteristics is not thinkable where
the conditions for conceiving dual ownership are lacking,30 it is not surprising that a very discerning civilian should decide that this "curious and
strange" concept is the fundamental characteristic of the trust 3 ' and that
our own Dr. Alfaro, well versed in both civil and common law, should state
that "The first thing by which the Latin Mind is struck in studying the
2
institution of trust is that it involves a conception of double ownership."
Since the very nature of the institution depends upon the rights of the beneficiary,3 3 it was to be expected that this concept would be an important
part of the study made by every Latin-American jurist who has written on
26. BOCERT, TRusTs; Scorr, TRusTs.
27. Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Ceitui Que Trust, 17 COL. L. REV. 269
(1917).
28. HUSTON, ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY, 87-148 (1915),
Pound, Book
Review, 26 HARV. L. REv. 462 (1913); Whitlock, Classification of the Law of Trusts, 1
CALIF. L. REV. 215 (1913).
29. Stone, op. cit. supra note 24.
30. WEISER, TRUSTS ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE 3 (1936).
31. FRANcE$CHELLI, IL TRUST NEL DIRtrrO INOLESE,

23-46

(Padua, 1935).

32. ALPARO, I COMPARATIVE LAW SERIES I (Dep't of Commerce).
33. LIZARDI, LA NATURALEZA JURIDICA DEL FIDEICOMISO 59 (Mexico,

1945).
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the subject. 4 Nevertheless it is the conclusion of the author of the present
study that any difference of opinion on this particular item of a beneficiary's rights is more a matter of words than of substance. In numerous
situations under the common law and in a lesser number under the civil
law, two or more persons ire interested in the same property. Though in
fact only one is the owner, the other has rights so closely resembling ownership that he is frequently spoken of as the owner. The best example, but
far from being the only one, is real estate on which there is a long term
lease or a lease for the life of the tenant. In much the same way the beneficiary of a trust has the present right of enjoyment of the trust property
but since the trustee has the power of disposition, he is the owner. His title
may be of lesser importance than is the beneficiary's right of enjoyment but
nevertheless he has the title and the beneficiary has merely the personal
rights of enjoyment listed by Dr. Molina and others.3 5 In the case of both
the tenant and the beneficiary, no difficulty arises so long as we speak of
their interest in the property as a right. They own and have title to that
right but it is in personam. If we designate such party as owner there is at
once the thought that he has a right in ren which is not the case.
May we quote from a personal letter of some years ago written by Dr.
Scott to the author of this study? A part of the letter reads as follows:
I agree with you that in introducing the trust in a civil law country it
is not of much help to emphasize various theories as to the nature of a
trust. I originally expressed my views in an article in 17 Columbia Law
Review 269 (1917). Dean (now Chief Justice) Harlan F. Stone wrote an
article taking the opposite view in 17 Columbia Law Review 467 (1917).
I think, however, that it really makes little difference in actual results
whether you adopt my theory of equitable ownership by the beneficiary or
Stone's theory, which follows that of Maitland and Ames, that the beneficiary has only a chose in action. The important thing is to understand
what actual rights are created by a trust rather than the theoretical nature
of those rights.
The concluding paragraph of Dean Stone's article to which Dr. Scott
refers is as follows:
To summarize the matter, it is believed that the view of the nature of
the right of the cestui que trust most consistent with the decisions and
which gives greatest promise of the development of the law upon a moral
basis is that the right of the cestui is a right in personam against the
trustee, specifically enforceable with reference to the trust res; that the
cestui acquires rights in personam against the third person not because he
34. Of recent years the subject of trusts has been of such interest that the bibliography
is extensive. Only a very limited number of the books and articles are listed in these notes.
35. See notes 12 and 13 upra.
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is equitable owner of the trust res, but through equity's imposing upon
third persons obligations in personam, because of their unconscientious
interference with the right which the cestui has against the trustee; that,
therefore, equity imposes on all the world the duty of not consciously
aiding in a breach of trust or preventing the cestui from having the benefit of the obligation of the trustee.
The two law review articles cited by Dr. Scott, one by himself and the
other by Chief Justice Stone, then Dean of Columbia University School
of Law, cannot be excelled in thoroughness of treatment. However, on the
basis of the little that appears in our books on the subject of trusts, Latin
writers have stated correctly that the Anglo-Saxon jurists "have bothered
themselves but little in formulating a constructive theory, and in their texts
they have concerned themselves more in declaring the prevailing rules and
their application. . . . Nevertheless those authors who have given study to
the nature of the trust institution have generally approached the matter
from the right angle, namely from the point of view of the rights of the
beneficiary." 3' Also that "English writers, especially the North Americans,
do not give to definitions the importance which we attribute to them, probably because they are the product of inductive development which ends with
(instead of commencing with) formulating a definition. Some commentators
do not even give definitions but merely describe the institution."3 7 Our
attitude may be due, as the writer first quoted has stated, to our having a
"habit of thought eminently practical and but little inclined to abstraction."
Accepting that description as personal to the author of this study, he finds
no great inconsistency in the concepts of Judge Stone and Dr. Scott and
still less in those formulated by the three Latin scholars who have most
recently written on the subject, Lic. Xavier 0. Aragon,38 Lic. Manuel
4
Lizardi Albarran3 9 and Lic. Roberto Molina Pasquel. 0
The first commentator states that in the trust institution there is a
broadening of the classical Roman concept of ownership, that the beneficiary does not properly have a right of property but nevertheless that he has
an economic and material interest in the trust assets and that this phenomenon of dual interests is similar or equivalent to that presented in the Roman
law by the "nuda propiedad" (bare title) and the "usufructo" (usofructuary).
The second writer concludes that the trust is composed of two rights
36. See note 33 supra.
37. Molina, Los Derechot del Fidescomisario supra at 41, note 22.
38. Aragon, Sistemas de Fideicomisos en Los Paimen Laiinoamericanos, 2 MEMORIA.
DE

LA TERCERA CONFERENCIA

DE

(Mexico, 1944).
39. LIZARDI, Op. Cit. suPra.
40. MOLINA, Op. Cit. supro.

i.A

FEDERACION

INTELAMERICANA

DE

AnOCADOS

303.

BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST IN A TRUST

whose existence is possible by reasons of the principles by which the new
institution is governed. One of these, that of the trustee, is characterized, if
not absolutely, at least in general, by a power of disposition and for that
reason the trustee appears to third persons to be the owner, that being the
essential attribute of ownership. However, his ownership is temporary,
seldom exceeding thirty years (in Mexico) and exists solely to carry out
the purposes of the trust so that it is without economic value to the trustee.
The second right, that of the beneficiary, is characterized by having an
economic value and is so intimately tied to the trust purposes as to tend to
be confounded with them since the latter usually represent in one form or
another an economic benefit for the beneficiary. The existence of the rights
of the beneficiary are nevertheless dependent upon those of the trustee and
are, accordingly, like the latter, also temporary. The final distinctive right
of the beneficiary is in its effect a property right in that, though ordinarily
it is the trustee who exercises control over the trust assets, the beneficiary
may in certain cases recover them from a third party in order to restore
them to the trust fund. It is because of this right that the interest of the
beneficiary acquires the appearance of being in rem, though of a special type.
The third writer had the advantage of writing last. He reviews the theses
of the other two, and appears to this investigator to only mildly criticize
their conclusions. His own conclusions do not appear to be radically different
though more difference may be discernible to a reviewer better trained in
abstract reasoning. As in his earlier writings, he denies any in rem character
to the rights of the beneficiary in a Mexican trust, and believes that he does
not need anything of the kind for protection of his interests under an elevated
standard as to the parties who may serve as trustees (solely banks of special
qualifications under Mexican law). Personal actions are sufficient to protect
their rights. The beneficiary has a primary and fundamental right to exact
fulfillment of the trust by the trustee but lacks any direct control of the
trust assets, to which the trustee has the exclusive title.
Apparently the work of Lic. Molina is the only book by a civilian which
relates directly and exclusively, as its title indicates, to the rights of the
beneficiary. He has performed a masterly service in reviewing the subject,
not merely from the standpoint of Mexican law but on the basis of the
concepts in other Latin jurisdictions.
A brilliant student of the subject of trusts in the classes of Dr. Austin
Scott at Harvard University was a young Frenchman, Dr. Pierre Lepaulle.
Both in an article which had wide circulation in North America 4' and,
after he returned home, in a book advocating the adoption and development
41. An Outsider's Viewpoint of the Nature of Trusts, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 52 (1928),
La Naturaleza del Trust, REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO Y JURISPRUDENCIA (Mexico,
1932).
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of trusts in France,"2 he takes issue with any definition which calls for a
division of ownership between trustee and beneficiary. He agrees with
several other commentators that, if this were the case, the trust could not
exist apart from a bipartite system of common law and equity. However,
he regards this concept as unsound and as inconsistent with not only the
principles of civil law but also with the decisions reached by English and
American courts; stating that they include in their opinions references to
dual ownership because of the history of their procedure, but that the
decisions reached are no different than would be the case in France where no
such concept exists. He reviews the arguments of the supporters of the doctrine that the beneficiaries' rights are in personam only and states that this
theory fails to explain the nature of trusts and does not fit with all the facts
of which account must be taken. He then examines the facts with relation to
the in rem theory and draws the conclusion that it is equally inadequate. His
decision is that one must go beyond these two notions and look for the
dynamic principle that organizes and determines from the outside both the
rights and the obligations of all parties concerned. In a search for this
dynamic principle, he finds that all that is really necessary in every trust
is a res and an appropriation of the res to some specified end; hence, that a
trust is a segregation of assets from the general property of individuals and
a dedication of those assets to a specified purpose, "a juridical device which
consists in a property independent of any owner, whose unity is brought
about by a purpose, this purpose being free within the limits of the laws
in force and of public policy." Dr. Chafee remarks that "it is significant of
the difference between our legal system and the French system that M.
Lepaulle should be so much more preoccupied with these problems of definition than we are." However, in concluding his article, Dr. Lepaulle discloses that in his opinion the concepts discussed are not of the importance
which has been attributed to them as is evidenced by his statement that "if
one ceases to explain trusts by using the difference between the jurisdictions
of common law and equity courts, legal title and equitable title, rights in
rem and rights in personam, many fallacious explanations may be avoided
and the true nature of trusts may be better discovered."
Now may the compiler of the present study have the presumption without causing offense to make two or three suggestions to which he is impelled
by an ancestral "habit of thought eminently practical," to wit:
42. TRAIT THEORIQUE FT PRATIQUE DES TRUSTS (Paris, 1932). The book has not
been translated into English hut an excellent summary of its contents was made by Professor Zachariah Chaffee, Jr. and published in 46 HARv. L. REV. 533. A rather detailed
exposition of the Lepaulle theory appears in Chapter II of the book of Dr. Narciso Enrique
Garay, EL TRUST ANcLOSAJON (Santiago, 1941). The theory is criticized by an equally
eminent civilian jurist, Dr. Max Rheinstein of the Law School of Chicago University,
published in the book of Lie. Molina cited in note 13 supra at 63, note 4. Also by Molina
and Franccschelli: see Molina, op. cit. supra at 61-67.

BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST IN A TRUST

That the trust institution has great possibilities for improving the welfare of families, communities and nations.
That in accordance with the spirit of resolutions of successive conventions of the Inter-American Bar Association it is desirable that laws be
enacted authorizing its use in countries where this is not now the case.
That the institution should be popularized by giving to the public, in
those countries where it is not well known, suitable descriptive articles comparable to those to which the lawyers have had access in their law reviews.
That aside from discussion of its theoretical concepts in professional
theses, the articles by Dr. Scott and Chief Justice Stone in the United States
and the writings of eminent civilians already cited, be considered as having
thoroughly covered the theoretical aspect of the subject without necessarily
deciding it or showing that a decision is necessary and that for the future
those who write for the law reviews or the lay press will best serve the
cause of spreading use of the institution by affording information as to its
advantages, methods of operation, items to be included in trust documents
and particularly those rights of the beneficiary summarized from the book
of Lic. Molina at the beginning of this study and found in the North American texts there cited.

